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COMMENT 
HOW THE RISE OF FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRATIC POWERS 
CHALLENGES THE ROLE OF 
COURTS IN ADJUDICATING 
CLAIMS OF INJURY INFLICTED BY 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chris Magnotta was one of the few people working in the 
World Trade Center buildings who survived the terrorist attack 
on September 11, 2001. 1 The aftermath of the traumatic event 
left him with nightmares, disrupted sleep, and anxiety at-
tacks-none of which he had experienced before the attack.2 
Chris's doctor diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disor-
der and prescribed Paxi1.3 Mter six months, Chris was feeling 
better and consequently decided to stop taking the drug.4 
Within 48 hours, he began to experience symptoms such as 
nausea, severe fatigue, and the sensation of electric "zaps" 
shooting through his body.5 These debilitating symptoms 
1 A Big Letdown?, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, May 12, 2003, at 191-92. 
2Id. 
3 DSM-IV-TR 463 (4th ed, 2000). Posttraumatic stress disorder is when a person 
re-experiences an extremely traumatic event accompanied by symptoms that cause a 
significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning 
Id.; supra note 1. 
• Id. 
• THoMAS C. TIMMRECK, PH.D., HEALTH SERVICES CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY A 
COMPENDIUM OF HEALTH-CARE AND PuBLIC HEALTH TERMINOLOGY 522 (Jones and 
Bartlett Publishers 1997) (1982). The sensation of "electric zaps" or strange sensations 




Top: Federal Bureaucratic Powers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
394 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
forced him back onto Paxil.6 With the help of his doctor, he 
weaned himself off the drug completely within four months.7 
Chris was never warned of the potential adverse withdrawal 
reactions that can occur when the drug is stopped abruptly.8 
He explained, "I want a clear warning of the side effects. . 
. [nlobody should have to go through this." 9 
Katherine Keith was prescribed Paxil for menopausal 
symptoms in 1997.10 After experiencing relief from her symp-
toms, she stopped taking the drug. ll Within 24 hours, Keith 
started experiencing nonstop vomiting and diarrhea, and intol-
erable brain "zaps" that caused uncontrollable crying. 12 Keith 
claims that the symptoms were intolerable to such a degree 
that on two separate occasions she stuck a pistol in her mouth 
and had to convince herself not to pull the trigger.13 Like Chris 
Magnotta, she was forced back onto Paxil and with her doctor's 
help was able to wean herself completely off the drug .14 
Magnotta and Keith are just two of tens of millions of 
Americans, one out of every ten, that have taken a Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (hereinafter "SSRI") antidepres-
sant.15 Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Luvox, and Celexa are drugs in-
cluded in this newer class of antidepressant medications.16 As 
a class, the SSRIs are easy to use--they usually just require one 
pill per day and have fewer, less complicated side effects than 









"See JOSEPH GLENMULLEN, M.D., PROZAC BACKLASH 15 (Simon & Schuster 
2000); There are many stories like the ones detailed above. Id. Tanya, a Paxil patient, 
went swimming at her health club. Id. at 64. On her second lap she felt like she was 
stuck by a bolt of lightning. Id. She was terrified and began flailing in the water. Id. 
Eventually another swimmer pulled her out of the water. Id. Immediately she asked 
her rescuer if he had experienced any sensation of electrical shocks in the water. Id. 
He had not. Id. The electric shocks continued as she sat poolside. Id. at 64-65. Start-
ing from her brain she felt the shocks travel down her arms; her vision was jumping 
back and forth; she felt nausea and dizziness accompanied by a buzzing in her ears. Id. 
at 65. She thought she was experiencing a panic attack. Id. Her doctor explained that 
she was probably experiencing withdrawal symptoms. Id. Tanya had stopped taking 
Paxil two days earlier. Id. 
16 WILLIAM S. APPLETON, M.D., PROZAC AND THE NEW ANTIDEPRESSANTS 50 
(Deborah Brody ed., Penguin Books 2000) (1997). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/6
2004] FEDERAL BUREAUCRATIC POWERS 395 
older antidepressants. 17 There is also extensive scientific 
documentation that patients may experience withdrawal when 
they discontinue use of SSRIs.18 
In August 2001, thirty-five Californians who allegedly suf-
fered severe withdrawal reactions from taking Paxil filed a 
class action against the manufacturer, GlaxoSmithKline Cor-
poration (hereinafter "aSK"), in California Superior COurt.19 
The action sought to hold aSK liable for suppressing informa-
tion about the drug's withdrawal effects. The plaintiffs as-
serted that aSK knew but failed to warn about Paxil's addic-
tive traits.20 
The plaintiff class sought a preliminary injunction to en-
join aSK from publicizing the statement, "Paxil is non habit-
17 Id at 57. Older antidepressants meaning the tricyclics which include trofanil, 
elavil, norpramin to name a few.Id. 
18 Michelle Fitzgerald, B.Sc (Pharm), SSRI Discontinuation Syndrome, 4 
ATLANTIC PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY QUARTERLY 3 (Issue 2, 2001). Reports indicate that 
30% of patients will experience some withdrawal type symptom upon reduction of 
dosage or discontinuation of use. Id. The symptoms may include dizziness, light-
headedness, vertigo or feeling faint; shock-like sensations (called paresthesia); anxiety; 
diarrhea; fatigue; gait instability; headache; insomnia; nausea; tremor; and visual 
disturbances. Id. Symptoms may develop within one to seven days of discontinuation 
or reduction in dosage, after at least one month's use of an SSRI. Id. See also Robert 
N. Golden, Ph.D, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor Elimination Half-Lives: The 
Long and the Short of It, 44 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 75-6 (Issue 2, 1998) (finding that, 
"[tlhis reported relationship between SSRI elimination half-life and risk of withdrawal 
syndrome is reminiscent of what we learned some time ago about benzodiazepines and 
their addictive derivatives."); see APPLETON, at 73, supra note 16. 
19 Paxil Users File Class Suit Over Withdrawal Reaction, 5 No. ANDREWS DRUG 
RECALL LITIG, REp. 9 (November 2001) (reporting that Keith v. GloxoSmithKline Corp. 
was filed in Cal. Superior Court, Los Angeles County on August 23, 2001); California 
'Court to Consider Renewed Paxil Class Suit, 19 No. ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL LITIG, 
REP. 10 (July 2003). In January 2003, a federal judge refused to certify a nationwide 
class stating the proposal would create a trial plan too complicated for a jury to follow. 
Id. The judge denied the class certification with leave to amend. Id. The plaintiffs re-
filed their suit to form two classes, an injunction class and a general damages class, 
limited to representing all Californians who were prescribed and consumed Paxil. Id. 
20 See generally Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereat In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-
01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed July 1, 2002) (asking that GSK be prohibited 
from making claims that Paxil is non habit-forming; stopped from down playing the side 
effects as mild and temporary; and prohibited from claiming that the drug has been 
studied in short and long-term use and is not associated with dependence or addiction). 
Telephone interview with Cindy Hall, Paralegal, Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & 
Shiavo (Oct. 3, 2003). Also, the plaintiffs seek to stop GSK from using the term "discon-
tinuation syndrome" because they allege the term has no purported medical meaning. 
Id. 
3
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forming," in national television commercials.21 The plaintiffs 
claimed that because patients suffered from severe withdrawal 
reactions after attempting to discontinue Prucil, the use of the 
phrase was false and misleading.22 The court found the plain-
tiffs had demonstrated that severe withdrawal reactions do in 
fact occur in at least some patients.23 The court reasoned that 
the phrase hindered the efforts of patients to seek and receive 
proper treatment for withdrawal symptoms.24 As a result, the 
motion for a preliminary injunction was granted.25 
In response to the order, GSK filed a motion to suspend 
the preliminary injunction, as well as a motion for reconsidera-
tion.26 In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (herein-
after "FDA") filed a brief supporting GSK's position that the 
advertisements were not misleadingp The court reversed itself 
and denied the injunction based specifically on evidence pre-
sented by the FDA regarding the internal review process in-
volved in the advertisements in question.28 Incidentally, certi-
fication of the proposed class was rejected in June of 2003.29 
The litigation, however, is continuing in the form of a mass 
joinder.30 
Although Prucil is the SSRI most likely to cause severe 
withdrawal effects, the drug manufacturer and the FDA insist 
that Prucil is not habit-forming.31 The FDA has complicated 
this legal battle by alleging that courts lack jurisdiction over 
21 Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 2, In re Paxil Litiga-
tion, No. CV-OI-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed August 16, 2002) 
22 Id. at 1. 
23 Id. at 2 
24 Id. at 10. 
25 Id. 
26 Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction at 10, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 MRP (CWx), 
(C.D. Cal. filed October 21, 2002). 
27 Id. at 1-2. 
23 Id. at 4. 
29 Telephone interview with Donald Farber, Law Office of Donald J. Farber (Oct. 
3, 2003). The certification of the state-wide proposed class was rejected in June 2003, 
but the litigation is continuing in the form of a national mass joinder. Id. There are 
fifteen cases across the country filed in both state and federal court. Id. The plaintiffs 
are hoping for a consolidation of all fifteen cases in Los Angeles, California for discov-
ery purposes. Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See Brief of the United States at 3-4, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 
(CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 2002). 
4
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the issue of whether Paxil is habit-forming.32 The FDA con-
tends that the determination of whether a drug is habit-
forming falls within the exclusive power of the agency.33 
The recent litigation surrounding Paxil illustrates the ob-
stacles injured plaintiffs face in recovering for harms suffered 
from side effects associated with prescription drugs. This 
Comment uses the recent Paxil litigation as an example of how 
the rise of federal bureaucratic powers, specifically those exer-
cised by the FDA to administer the Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (hereinafter "FDCA"), increasingly challenge the role of 
courts in adjudicating tort claims of injury inflicted by prescrip-
tion drugs. Part I explains the current labeling requirements 
for prescription drugs.34 Part II describes product liability law 
regarding claims involving prescription drugs.3s Part III ana-
lyzes the drug manufacturers' and FDA's defenses to state tort 
claims, specifically preemption and primary jurisdiction.36 Part 
IV discusses the current law as it applies to the recent Paxil 
litigation.37 Part V analyzes alternative interpretations that 
would achieve fairer results.3S Finally, Part VI of this Com-
ment concludes that FDA prescription drug labeling require-
ments should be viewed as minimal guidelines subject to en-
hancement by state court jury verdicts.39 
I. CURRENT REGULATIONS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
Congress delegates authority to agencies to carry out their 
missions through the use of enabling statutes.40 One example 
of an enabling statute is the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (hereinafter "FDCA"). 41 The FDCA assigns responsibility 
to the FDA to ensure that drugs marketed in the United States 
32 See discussion in Part III, infra. 
33 Brief of the United States at 9, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 (CWx), 
(C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 2002). 
34 See infra notes 40-71 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 97-162 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 163-206 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 207-251 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 252 and accompanying text . 
.., ELIZABETH C. RICHARDSON, J.D., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCEDURE 48 
(Delmar Publishers 1996). 
41 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2000). 
5
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are safe and effective.42 The regulation of drugs marketed in 
the United States includes a process for approval, promotion, 
and labeling of new drugs.43 The FDA has designed a regula-
tory labeling scheme to ensure that necessary information is 
given to physicians so that they can prescribe the safe and ef-
fective use of drugs.44 
A. LABELING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
Prescription medications are drugs that are approved by 
the FDA and available to the public only when dispensed by 
licensed physicians and pharmacists.45 The availability of pre-
scription medications is limited because they are considered 
unsafe if used without the supervision of a physician.46 A li-
censed medical practitioner balances the benefits of using a 
particular prescription drug against the accompanying risks on 
a patient-by-patient basis.47 To assist medical practitioners in 
balancing important risk information, the FDA provides strict 
labeling requirements for prescription drugs.48 
A drug cannot be legally introduced into the market unless 
it is approved by the FDA. 49 The approval process begins by the 
submission of a New Drug Application (hereinafter "NDA").50 
42 21 U.S.C. § 335 (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 5.1O(a)(1) (2003) (The United States Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services delegated authority to the FDA). 
43 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
« See infra Part II for further discussion about the duty to warn and the learned 
intermediary doctrine . 
.. TIMMRECK, at 572 supra note 5 (providing the medical definition of prescrip-
tion drugs); see 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2000) (granting the FDA the authority to ensure that 
drugs are safe and effective) . 
.. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (2000). 
47 See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 
Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5 th Cir. 1974) . 
.. 21 U.S.C. §393 (2000). The FDA's mission is to promote public health by re-
viewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated 
products in a timely manner. [d. The FDA is the agency that ensures that human and 
veterinary drugs are safe and effective. [d.; see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 
696 (1948) (stating that the FDA was created to "protect consumers from dangerous 
products.") . 
• 9 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000); Edison Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Food and Drug Admin., 
Dept. of Health, Ed., and Welfare, 600 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). (finding that new 
drug application could not be approved "[wlhere drug manufacturer failed to comply 
with this chapter and regulations governing the manufacturing, sampling and labeling 
of proposed new drug ... "). 
50 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (l)(F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(2) (2003); See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.50 (2003) (detailing the contents of the NDA). 
6
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When filing an NDA, a drug manufacturer is required to sub-
mit all proposed labeling, which includes the information of 
risks associated with the drug.51 FDA drug labeling regulations 
categorize risk information according to the severity of the risk 
and the degree to which the risk has been scientifically vali-
dated. 52 The label hierarchy for disclosing risk information 
spans from the most severe situations, called contraindications, 
to the least serious side effects, known as adverse reactions.53 
As side effects increase in intensity and severity, the manufac-
turer's warning with respect to the drug's potential for harm 
ascends to a higher label heading.54 In the NDA labeling, a 
manufacturer must establish that a drug is safe and effective 
for its specified uses.55 
" 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (1) (F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50 (c)(2)(i) (2003), 314.110 
(2003) (detailing the approval letter after NDA application meets requirements). 
52 See generally 21 C.F.R § 201.57 (a)-(m) (2003). See also Lars Noah, The Im-
perative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" From the "Need to Know" About 
Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 327 (1994). 
63 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (a)-(m) (2003) (specifying the topic headings and mandated 
order for prescription drug labeling as: Description, Clinical Pharmacology, Indications 
and Usage, Contraindications, Warnings, Precautions, Adverse Reactions, Drug Abuse 
and Dependence, Overdosage, Dosage and Administration, How Supplied, Animal 
Pharmacology and/or Animal Toxicology, and "Clinical Studies" and "References."). See 
McFadden v. Haritatos, 448 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (stating it was obvi-
ous the labeling sections were set forth in the C.F.R. in descending order of impor-
tance.); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (d) (2003) (Contraindications "shall describe those situations 
in which the drug should not be used because the risk of the use clearly outweighs any 
possible benefit ... [k]nown hazards and not theoretical possibilities shall be listed."). 
Cf 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (g) (2003) (describing an adverse reaction as an "undesirable 
effect" reasonably associated with the drug). The drug manufacturer must list the 
approximate frequency of each adverse reaction in rough estimates or orders of magni-
tude. Id. For example, "[t]he most frequent adverse reactions(s) to (name of drug) is 
(are)(list reactions). This (these) occur(s) in about (e.g., on-third of patients; one in 30 
patients; less than one-tenth of patients). Less frequent adverse reactions are (list 
reactions), which occur in approximately (e.g., one in 100 patients). Other adverse 
reactions, which occur rarely, in approximately (e.g., one in 1,000 patients), are (list 
reactions)." Id. Percent figures are only permitted if they are well documented by 
controlled studies, they reflect general experience, and they do not imply a greater 
degree of accuracy than what exists.). Id. 
54 Id. 
55 21 U.S.C.§ 355 (b), (d) (2000). See also Declaration of Thomas Scarlett at 3, In 
re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal filed July 19, 2002). Tho-
mas Scarlett is a partner in Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, a law firm that specializes 
in matters concerning the FDA Id. at 2. 
7
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B. FDA PROCESS FOR DRUG APPROVAL 
The FDA determines safety and effectiveness by reviewing 
the conditions of use that are specified in the labeling con-
tained in the NDA.56 The drug manufacturer and the FDA at-
tempt to reconcile any differences on what content should ap-
pear in the labeling. 57 Ultimately, the FDA reserves the right 
to condition the final approval of a new drug based on label re-
visions suggested by the agency.58 The labeling is commonly 
referred to as the "package insert" or "prescribing information" 
and is considered the official labeling for a drug. 59 Once ap-
proved, the labeling may not be changed without FDA ap-
proval, except for minor changes.GO The labeling is intended to 
summarize all information a physician requires to prescribe 
the drug in a safe and effective manner.61 
Mter receiving all contents of the NDA, the FDA conducts 
a comprehensive safety review of the clinical data contained in 
the application.62 The safety review is designed to identify po-
tential safety risks, to assess whether the drug is sufficiently 
safe for public use and whether certain risks should be dis-
closed in the drug labeling.63 During its review, the FDA per-
forms a drug abuse liability assessment.64 Abuse liability is 
.. Id. at 3. 
" Id . 
.. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (b) (1) (F) (2000); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50 (c) (2) (i) (2003), 
314.110 (2003) . 
.. SCARLETI' at 3, supra note 55. 
60 Id.; 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.100(c)(2) (2003); 314.70 (2003); see notes 154-155, infra. 
(citing state court holdings in which the drug manufacturer was responsible for provid-
ing more information than required by FDA regulations). 
61 Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 n.11 (1" Cir. 1981); SCARLETT 
at 3,supra note 55. 
62 Declaration of Thomas Kline at 4, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 
(CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed July 19, 2002). Thomas Kline is the Director of U.S. Regulatory 
Affairs at GSK. Id. As a director he is required to act as a liaison between GSK and 
the FDA regarding marketed and investigational drug products. Id. at 2. 
63 Id. at 4. 
54 See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Draft Guidelines for Abuse 
Liability Assessment at 1, Drug Abuse Advisory Committee, FDA (July 1990), In re 
Paxil Litigation, No. CV-OI-07937 (CWx), Exhibit 2. The FDA created the Drug Abuse 
Advisory Committee (hereinafter "DAAC") to prepare the guidelines for abuse liability 
assessments. Id. In drafting the guidelines the DDAC considered (1) the promotion of 
public health by encouraging the development of safe and effective drugs; and (2) the 
protection of the public health by insuring that new products are introduced with an 
adequate degree of scientific knowledge and, where indicated, and appropriate degree 
of regulatory control related to their abuse liability. Id. 
8
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"the likelihood that a drug with psychoactive or central nervous 
system effects will sustain patterns of non-medical self-
administration that result in disruptive or undesired conse-
quences."65 Although the FDA does not prescribe an exact stan-
dard for testing, it does place the responsibility on the manu-
facturer to test for abuse liability in animals and humans.66 All 
NDAs include a section addressing possible issues concerning 
abuse liability.67 The drug manufacturer is required to submit 
its testing information in this section in the NDA. 68 
If the FDA determines the drug does have abuse potential, 
it notifies the Drug Enforcement Agency (hereinafter "DEA"), 
who may consider scheduling the drug as a controlled sub-
stance under the Controlled Substances Act.69 If the FDA de-
cides the drug does not have abuse potential, it does not notify 
the DEA.70 After a new drug is approved and introduced to the 
public, the FDA continues to monitor the frequency and sever-
ity of adverse drug experiences to assess whether labeling 
changes are necessary. 71 
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY LAw AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
Typically, under product liability law, an injured plaintiff 
can bring an action to recover against a manufacturer based on 
strict liability theory. 72 Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
65 Id. at 2. 
&SId. 
67 Id. at 3. 
saId. 
69 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(c), (f) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.104 (2003). 
70 SCARLETT at 10-11, supra note 55; see generally DRAFT GUIDELINES at 1, supra 
note 64. 
71 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.303(a) (2003), 310.305 (b) (2003), 314.80(a) (2003). The manu-
facturer has a duty to advise the FDA of any reports of "adverse experiences" with the 
drug, often referred to as postmarketing reports. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(a) (2003). An 
adverse drug experience is any adverse event occurring in the course of the use of a 
drug product in professional practice; from drug overdose, whether accidental or inten-
tional; from drug abuse; from drug withdrawal; and any failure of expected pharmacol-
ogical action. Id. The "adverse experience" must be reported whether it is reasonably 
associated with the drug or not. Id. For the purpose of this Comment, the terms 
"risks," "dangers," and "(adverse) side effects" will be used interchangeably even 
though there may be subtle differences distinguishing the terms. 
72 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the origin of the 
strict liability doctrine, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (formulating the strict liability doctrine which 
holds a manufacturer absolutely liable if when it placed a product on the market, it 
9
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ond) of Torts suggests a manufacturer of a product is strictly 
liable for injuries to consumers, or their property, caused by 
defects in the design of the product.73 Products deemed "un-
avoidably unsafe" are an exception to the general strict liability 
rule. 74 An injured plaintiff, however, can bring an action for an 
unavoidably unsafe product if the manufacturer has not pro-
vided adequate warnings on the product.75 
A. PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ARE UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE 
PRODUCTS 
Under products liability law, prescription drugs are pre-
sumed to be unavoidably unsafe.76 Unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts create risks to the user even when used as intended.77 
Comment k to Restatement Section 402A acknowledges that 
there exist products that, in the present state of human knowl-
edge, are incapable of being made safe for their intended use.78 
knew the product was to be used without inspection, and the product proved to have a 
defect that caused injury). 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section suggests that 
manufacturers are strictly liable for injuries to the consumer or his/her property if the 
court deems a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." [d. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D 
Products Liability § 545 (1997). This is true even if the manufacturer shows that the 
product was faultlessly designed and manufactured, but dangerous or likely to cause 
harm if not properly used. [d.; see also Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 923 
(Kan. 1990) (identifying the three main types of product defects: manufacturing flaws, 
design defects, and inadequate warnings with regard to use); PROSSER & KEETON, THE 
LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695-98 (5 th ed. 1984. 
,. See Grunberg v. The Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (analyzing the ap-
plication of comment k). 
75 See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
7. See e.g., Grunberg, 813 P.2d at 92 (finding that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18- 2(1) 
(Supp. 1990) presents a rebuttable presumption that FDA-approved drugs are un-
avoidably unsafe). Cf. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal.App.3d 812 (1985) (stat-
ing that California was the first state to utilize a risklbenefit analysis to determine 
which drugs fell within the protective scope of comment k). But see Brown v. Superior 
Court, 751 P.2d 470, 483 (Cal. 1988) (overturning Kearl and establishing the rule in 
California, that all prescription drugs are entitled as a matter of law to an exemption 
from strict liability claims based upon design defects). Some courts have applied com-
ment k on a case-by-case basis to determine if a drug is "unavoidably unsafe." See 
Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987; Savina, 795 P.2d at 915; see also 
Feldman v. Lederle Lab. ,479 A2d 374, 382-83 (N.J. 1984) (dealing with allegations of 
failure to warn, but asserting, "Whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe should be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis .... "). 
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt k (1965). There are some 
products that are incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. [d. 
These are especially common in the field of drugs. [d. 
78 [d. 
10
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Accordingly, products that fall within this category are pro-
tected against strict liability claims.79 Therefore, manufactur-
ers of unavoidably unsafe products are not held strictly liable 
for injuries so long as their products are accompanied by proper 
warnings.80 In the absence of a strict liability claim, a manu-
facturer may nevertheless be held liable for injuries to a con-
sumer if the plaintiff can show the manufacturer failed to ade-
quately warn of the product's risks.81 
B. DuTY To WARN: THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 
Generally, the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe 
product has a duty to warn the product's intended and foresee-
able users of the product's dangers.82 Prescription drug manu-
facturers constitute an exception to the general rule.83 A pre-
scription drug manufacturer's duty to warn is satisfied when a 
warning of the risks associated with a drug is given directly to 
the physician.84 The physician acts as the "learned intermedi-
ary" between the drug manufacturer and the patient.85 The 
79 [d. 
80 [d. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1" Cir. 1981); Reyes 
v, Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 
121, 128-9 (9'h Cir. 1968); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 
(D.S.D.1967), aft'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Brown, 751 P.2d at 481; Toner, 732 
P.2d at 305; Savina, 795 P.2d at 924; Feldman, 479 A.2d at 374; Castrignano v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 780 (R.I. 1988); Theresa Schwartz, Product Liability 
Law and Pharmaceuticals: New Developments and Divergent Trends, 43 FOOD DRUG 
COSMo L.J. 33 (1988) (giving an explanation of the widespread court-acceptance of 
comment k's applicability to prescription drug manufacturers) . 
• , Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92, citing Toner, 732 P.2d at 305 ("The purpose of 
comment k is to protect from strict liability products that cannot be designed more 
safely. Ifhowever, such products are mismanufactured or unaccompanied by adequate 
warnings, the seller may be liable even if the plaintiff cannot establish the seller's 
negligence .... This limitation on the scope of comment k immunity is universally recog-
nized."). 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) (mandates that manu-
facturers provide warnings). PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, 698 (5 th ed. 
1984). (Warnings should be directed at the intended users as well as at reasonably 
foreseeable users.). 
83 Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91 (holding that "the manufacturer's duty is to warn the 
doctor, not the patient. The doctor acts as an 'informed intermediary' between the 
manufacturer and the patient, evaluating the patient's needs, assessing the risks and 
benefits of available drugs, prescribing one, and supervising its use.") 
.. [d. See e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5 th Cir. 
1992); Sterling Drug, 408 F.2d at 992 (8th Cir. 1969); Wyeth Lab., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 
530 So. 2d 688, 691-92 (Miss. 1988) . 
.. See Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91; Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (summarizing the under-
lying principle behind the learned intermediary doctrine). 
11
Top: Federal Bureaucratic Powers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
404 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
"learned intermediary" rule exists because it is the physician 
who evaluates the risks and benefits of prescription treatments 
when selecting drugs for the patient.86 Furthermore, it is the 
physician who has a duty to communicate the risks associated 
with drug treatment directly to the patient.87 For that reason, 
it is the physician, rather than the patient, who requires the 
warning from the manufacturer.88 
If the manufacturer does not adequately warn the physi-
cian, the patient could file a lawsuit claiming that the manu-
facturer breached its duty to provide adequate warnings.89 
Most commonly, the manufacturer has provided a warning that 
the plaintiff alleges is inadequate.9o A patient may, for in-
stance, experiences a side effect that was not included in the 
label.91 When the label clearly warns of the plaintiffs injury, a 
court will grant summary judgment in favor of the manufac-
turer.92 Courts must assess on a case-by-case basis whether a 
particular risk warning is adequate.93 
Courts generally fmd warnings to be adequate if they con-
vey a fair message of the necessary level of caution required to 
avoid the potential dangers.94 For instance, warning labels 
have been considered inadequate because of diluted language 
.. Id. 
87Id. 
88 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (finding that the choice the physician makes is "an 
informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both 
patient and palliative," but that there are situations where the manufacturer must 
warn the patient directly because doses are standardized). See, e.g., Id. (extending 
duty to vaccine manufacturers because doses are standardized); MacDonald v. Ortho 
Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass.1985)(extending duty to birth control pill 
manufacturers because birth control is taken by healthy women, who should be made 
aware of the high incidence of serious risks associated with their use, and recognizing 
that some courts have gone so far as to impose a duty on the manufacturer to warn the 
patient in a different language from that which the FDA sets forth in its labeling re-
strictions). See also In re Certified Question from The United States Dist. Court for the 
E. Dist. of Mich., 358 N.W. 2d 873 (Mich.1984). 
88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, THE 
LAw OF TORTS § 99, at 695-98 (5th ed. 1984); 
90 Id. 
91Id. 
92 E.g., Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharm. Co., 428 F. Supp. 496, 498 (D.D.C. 1997); 
Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989); Johnson v. Am. Cy-
anamid Co., 774 F.2d 830, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1985). 
93 See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Tampa 
Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609 (Fla. 1958); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 
N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981). 
94 Id. 
12
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or improper tone.95 Therefore, drug manufacturers who are 
acting in compliance with FDA labeling regulations may never-
theless be held liable in state courts for inadequate warnings.96 
The next section discusses common defenses a drug manufac-
turer may employ in response to failure-to-warn claims based 
on inadequate prescription drug labeling. 
III. DEFENSES TO STATE TORT CLAIMS: FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION 
Drug manufacturers are required to follow the drug appli-
cation and labeling guidelines set forth by the FDA. 97 The 
FDA's labeling guidelines strike the balance between providing 
enough risk information to provide adequate warning informa-
tion without over-warning.98 The policy behind this balance is 
that providing too many warnings could intimidate consumers 
or lessen the importance of the warning system in genera1.99 
A successful state tort claim against a drug manufacturer 
for failure to provide adequate warnings may create a perverse 
result. 100 This is because the drug manufacturer has complied 
with FDA regulations but is nevertheless being punished for a 
violation of state law. 101 To avoid this result, drug manufactur-
ers have asserted defenses of federal preemption and primary 
jurisdiction. 102 Both of these defenses are grounded in the no-
tion that the power found, either explicitly or implicitly, within 
an agency's enabling statute divests the state courts of their 
95 Sterling, 408 F.2d at 994; See e.g., McFadden, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (comment-
ing that when label stated that the drug side effects were reversible the court com-
mented that "tends to qualifY and dilute the whole of the [adverse reactions) section's 
admonition."); Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y 1968) 
(finding that a warning was "water[ed) down" with "shrewd use of descriptive adjec-
tives"). 
96 See, e.g., Needham v. White Lab., 639 F.2d 394, 396 (7tl> Cir. 1981); Davis, 399 
F.2d at 122. 
97 See supra Part I for discussion of the labeling requirements for prescription 
drugs. 
98 See supra Part I for discussion of the FDA process for drug approval. 
99 See NOAH at 374, supra note 52. The fourth section contains an in-depth dis-
cussion on the hazards and causes of excessive warnings. Id. 
100 See Needham, 639 F.2d at 396. 
IOIId. 
102 E.g., Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Grant-
ing Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), 
(C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 22, 2002). 
13
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jurisdictional power. l03 The two doctrines are easily confused, 
which can lead to misapplication.104 An understanding of the 
doctrines is necessary to grasp how each is applied to litigation 
concerning prescription drugs. 
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
Federal preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution.105 It is the principle that 
federal law can supersede any incongruent state law or regula-
tion. lOG The doctrine is fundamental because it allocates power 
between the federal and state governments. l07 
For preemption purposes, courts have broadly defined fed-
eral and state law. l08 Federal law is defined to include the 
United States Constitution, federal statutes, and federal regu-
lations promulgated by agencies. l09 State law encompasses 
common-law tort actions, state statutes, and state regula-
tions. llo Hence, state court tort actions that are inconsistent 
with federal regulations violate the Supremacy Clause.lll 
Congress may supersede state law either by express or im-
plied preemption.1l2 Express preemption occurs when Congress 
explicitly states that federal law preempts contrary state law.1l3 
103 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
1" See infra Part IV for discussion of the controversy over the application of the 
preemption doctrine as an affirmative defense. 
105 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1,3 (1824). 
106 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY, 545, (2d ed. 2001) 
(defining preemption, derived from the Supremacy Clause, as a principle that a federal 
law can supersede any incongruent state law or regulation); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. 
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984) (finding that under the Supremacy Clause a state 
regulation may be pre-empted by federal law first, when Congress has expressed a 
clear intent to pre-empt state law through statute; second, when it is expressly stated 
or implied that Congress intended to leave no room for the States to supplement fed-
eral law; and third, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible 
(citations omitted». 
107 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); see generally Foote, 
Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REv 
1429 (1984). 
108 See infra notes 109-111. 
109 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); 
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
no See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963). 
n1 See note 97, supra. 
112 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
n. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (expressing preemption regarding cigarettes); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515 (1992) (holding federal Cigarette 
14
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Preemption is usually viewed as implied when Congress in-
tends that federal law occupy a given field. 114 Under this form 
of implied preemption, courts will find that the federal regula-
tory scheme is sufficiently comprehensive that there is no room 
for additional state law. 115 Finally, even if Congress has not 
intended that federal law occupy a field, state law may never-
theless be preempted if it actually conflicts with federal law, 
such that compliance with both state and federal law is impos-
sible. 116 
Congress has not enacted an express preemption provision 
covering prescription drugs.ll7 As a result, common-law failure-
to-warn claims have been brought against drug manufacturers 
notwithstanding the detailed federal labeling requirements.lls 
Several courts have held that the FDCA does not impliedly 
preempt state law.119 In the absence of any Supreme Court in-
terpretation, however, the debate continues over whether FDA 
labeling regulations preempt state tort law.120 
Labeling and Advertising Act preempted State laws regulating and prohibiting adver-
tising based on smoking and health.) 
,,< Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
"5Id. at 232 (finding that "[alll the Federal Act requires is that warehousemen 
receive products for storage without making discriminations between persons," and 
that "[wlhat the lllinois Commission promulgates or requires ... might indeed 
strengthen and bolster the federal regulatory scheme and in no way dilute, impair, or 
oppose it."). 
116 California v. ARC Am. Corp. 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
117 See, e.g., Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714-23; Pharm. Soc'y of the State of 
N.Y. v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953,958 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a state regula-
tion mandating that drug manufacturer be identified on the label was not preempted). 
"8 NOAH at 356, supra note 52; see John F. Del Giorno, Federal Preemption of 
Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing on State 
Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 629 (1989) 
(applying four basic tests, from varied case law, to determine implied preemptive in-
tent and concluding that Congress implied that FDA regulations preempt state law). 
"9 See, e.g., Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615, 625 (N.D. lll. 1999) 
(considering Knoll's assertion that the FDA's detailed federal regulations covering 
advertisement of prescription drugs preempted lllinois' attempt to restrict advertise-
ment by regulating the content of broadcast television a "frivolous argument."); Ohler 
v. Purdue Pharma. L.P., 2002 WL 88945, at *9 (E.D. La. 2002) (arguing that "the evi-
dence presented does not clearly demonstrate either that Congress or the FDA in-
tended to preempt the field by implementing regulations pursuant to statutory man-
date in the field of prescription drugs labeling, and thereby completely displacing State 
laws and regulations which may have the affect of elevating the standards and duties 
owed by manufacturers with respect to warnings and labeling of prescription drugs.") 
120 E.g., Brief of the United States of America, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-
07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002); Amicus Brief for the United States in 
Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of 
the District Court's Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee 
15
Top: Federal Bureaucratic Powers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
408 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
B. PRIMARY JURISDICTION 
If a court does not find that federal law preempts a state 
tort claim, the FDA may still claim to have exclusive authority 
to make the final determinations.121 Over time, some govern-
mental agencies have developed into adjudicative bodies and 
have consequently started to decide issues that were tradition-
ally brought before courtS.122 Primary jurisdiction is a judi-
cially-made doctrine used to clarify powers allocated between 
the agencies and the courtS.123 The doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion allows a district court to refer a matter within its original 
jurisdiction if doing so will "promot[e] proper relationships be-
tween the courts and administrative agencies charged with 
particular regulatory duties."124 
Primary jurisdiction applies when hearing a dispute in-
volves the resolution of issues that, "under a regulatory 
scheme, have been placed in special competence of an adminis-
trative body."125 There is no set formula that a court uses to 
determine if primary jurisdiction is applicable.126 Instead, case-
by-case analysis is performed to determine if the rationale un-
derlying the doctrine is present and whether the purposes of 
the doctrine will be accomplished, if applied. 127 There are fac-
tors, however, for a court to consider when determining 
and cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498, (9th Cir. filed Sept. 
2,2002). 
121 See infra notes 125-148 and accompanying text. 
122 See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
TREATISE § 14.1 (3n1 ed. 1994); Fred Huntsman, Comment, Who Makes the Call? The 
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine in Texas after Cash America International Inc., v. Ben-
nett, Subaru of America, Inc. v. McDavid Nissan, Inc. and Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 
54 BAYLORL. REV. 897, 901-06 (2002). 
123 Id. 
124 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303 (1976); Bernhardt v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL 1738645, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that "[tlhe doc-
trine ... allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the 'conventional ex-
periences of judged' or 'falling within the realm of administrative discretion' to an ad-
ministrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight. "). 
125 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); United States v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9 th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[tlhe particular 
agency deferred to must be one that Congress has vested with the authority to regulate 
an industry or activity such that it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to 
deny the agency's power to resolve the issues in question."). 
126 W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64; KENNETH DAVIS, at 275-76, supra note 122 
(explaining how this decision established the test for applying the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine). 
127 W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64. 
16
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whether to invoke the doctrine: first, the need for uniformity 
and consistency in the regulation of industry delegated to an 
agency; second, the need for agency expertise in disputes in-
volving complicated issues of fact that is outside the general 
experience of the judiciary; and lastly, the extent that referral 
to an agency will add expense and delay.128 It is important to 
note that these factors should be examined in light of the cir-
cumstances of each case.129 
Courts refer to the agency's enabling statute to evaluate 
the three factors listed above, to decide if invocation of primary 
jurisdiction is appropriate.130 Statutory interpretation has led 
many courts to misapply and misuse the doctrine. 131 Added to 
the seeming confusion is the fact that the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction covers two distinct situations.132 
The first situation arises when an issue falls within an 
agency's exclusive statutory jurisdiction.133 If the statute pro-
vides that the disputed issue falls within the exclusive original 
jurisdiction of the regulatory agency, the court is ousted of its 
jurisdictionY4 Nonetheless, the agency's resolution of the issue 
will be subject to judicial review.135 If the agency's resolution of 
the issue does not resolve the entire case, then the case contin-
ues along whatever path the statute prescribes.136 
The second situation permits a court to refer an issue to an 
agency that possesses more information about the issue than 
128 See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc. 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973); Far E. Con-
ference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Nader, 426 U.S. at 303; Bernhardt, 2000 
WL 1738645, at *2 (balancing the "advantages of applying the ... doctrine against any 
potential costs and delays resulting form the referral of the matter .... "); see KENNETH 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, at 272-80, supra note 122. 
129 W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 64. 
130 See Primary Jurisdiction-Effect of Administrative Remedies on the Jurisdic-
tion of Courts, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1937-38). 
131 E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal Rptr. 2d 487, 499 n.15 (1992) 
(reasoning thus: "[als have other state and federal courts in other contexts, we referred 
to "exhaustion" of administrative remedies in this portion of Raja although we were in 
fact considering a question of prior resort to administrative procedures under the pri-
mary jurisdiction doctrine."). 
132 See Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 5, In re Paxil Liti-
gation, No. CV 01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. Issued Aug., 16, 2002) (citing Arsberry 
v. State of m., 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7 th Cir. 2001); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, at 272-






Top: Federal Bureaucratic Powers
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
410 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
the court.137 Applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
in this situation is based on the application of a practical test 
that balances the advantages and disadvantages of allowing 
the agency to resolve the issue.13s In this situation, a court can 
consult an agency even if the agency does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction.139 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this kind 
of situation is usually invoked when regulations involve arcane 
issues, when a court requests an amicus curiae brief from an 
agency, or when the court has appointed an agency to be a spe-
cial master.140 Either the court and the agency share concur-
rent jurisdiction or the court holds jurisdiction alone and solic-
its the advice of the agency.141 In sum, one situation under the 
primary jurisdiction analysis requires judicial deferral on a 
disputed issue to the appropriate agency.142 The other situation 
provides the court discretion in seeking out agency assis-
tance.143 
When a legal issue overlaps with factual determinations 
that fall within an agency's expertise, the courts must apply 
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to clarify how the courts 
and agency need to interface to solve the legal matter.l44 In 
order to do this, the court must determine "the character of the 
controverted question and the nature of the enquiry necessary 
for its solution."145 That is to say, exclusive jurisdiction over an 
issue is vested in an agency when it is the regulation itself that 
is being attacked or disputed. 146 When a suit is brought for ei-
ther a discriminatory application or violation of the regulation 
(i.e., the regulation itself is not being attacked), the question of 
fact does not call for agency discretion and courts may hear the 
137Id. 
138 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563. 
139 Id. 
140 See Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 5-6, In re Paxil 
Litigation, No. CV 01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. Issued Aug., 16, 2002)(citing Ars-
berry, 244 F .3d at 563; see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, at 272-280, supra note 122. 
141 Id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 Bernhardt, 2000 WL 1738645, at *2 (applying primary jurisdiction specifically 
"to cases involving technical and intricate questions of fact and policy that Congress 
has assigned to a specific agency."). 
14. PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1254, supra note 130 (quoting Brandeis, J., in Great 
N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922». 
146 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563; see PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1256, supra note 130; 
see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 305-09, supra note 122. 
18
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dispute.147 Thus, questions of law can be decided by courts ex-
clusively, as long as the questions do not depend on technical 
knowledge or administrative discretion.148 
Even though a court may have jurisdiction over a suit, it 
may still decline to review an agency action if it is not final or if 
the petitioner did not exhaust all the administrative remedies 
available.149 Courts generally require the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies prior to judicial review.150 A petitioner must 
first take a dispute through the agency's administrative proc-
ess prescribed in the statute before bringing a dispute to the 
courtS.151 Most cases use "finality" and "exhaustion" inter-
changeably, because if a petitioner has not exhausted an ad-
ministrative remedy the agency action is not final. 152 
The policy behind requiring exhaustion is that if an admin-
istrative remedy is unexhausted, the suit is premature; judicial 
resources should not be wasted until all possible avenues of 
administrative relief have been explored.153 If, however, "con-
siderations of individual justice, efficiency, or wise judicial ad-
ministration support the need for judicial review," exhaustion 
may not be required. 154 Exhaustion is also usually not required 
when it would be futile, for instance, when the agency has al-
ready stated that it would deny relief.155 
14' [d. 
148 See e.g. PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1256, supra note 130 (arguing that "[ilf the 
interpretation of a tariff turns on the peculiar technical meaning of words, as distin-
guished from their ordinary meaning, or on the existence of incidents of service alleged 
to be attached by usage to the transaction, the question is within the primary jurisdic-
tion of the agency). 
14. PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1261, supra note 130; KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 305-
09, supra note 122. 
150 [d. 
151 KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 305-09, supra note 122. 
152 [d. 
153 See PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1261, supra note 130; see also KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS at 309, supra note 121 (listing five reasons for the exhaustion requirement). 
, .. KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 307, supra note 122 (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) "[It isl the long settled rule of judicial 
administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened 
injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted"). 
155 PRIMARY JURISDICTION at 1264, supra note 130. 
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C. CONTROVERSY OVER APPLICATION OF PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Proponents of FDA preemption insist that it was Con-
gress's intent to give the FDA complete authority, utilizing sci-
entific opinion to determine what prescription drug information 
should be made available to the public.156 The reasoning is that 
if courts of various jurisdictions are allowed to decide what 
constitutes adequate warnings for safe and effective use, the 
public will receive inconsistent labeling information from juris-
diction to jurisdiction.157 Ultimately, this would frustrate the 
FDA's efforts to promote uniformity and consistency in the 
regulation of prescription drug labeling.15s 
Opponents of FDA preemption contend that the FDA's 
drug labeling requirements are minimum standards subject to 
supplementation by a jury's verdict.159 They believe that it is 
up to a lay jury to determine, based on the facts of each case, if 
a drug manufacturer has met its common-law duty to warn.160 
Courts have supported this view by verifying that additional 
warnings may be added to labeling without advance FDA ap-
'56 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(4)(2000) (explaining the FDA's mission as one "in consulta-
tion with experts in science, medicine, and public health, and in cooperation with con-
sumers, users, manufacturers, importers, packers, distributors, and retailers of regu-
lated products"); see John F. Del Giorno, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug La-
beling: Antidote for Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing On State Court Jury Decision 
in Products Liability Cases, 22 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 629, 644-656 (1989) (giving a 
detailed analysis establishing that FDA labeling regulations meet all four of the tests 
for implied preemption and, thus, preempt state law); see also Brief of the United 
States of America at 4-6, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. 
Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002). 
'57 See Bernhardt, 2000 WL 1738645, at *3 (directing Pfizer to issue the notices 
that would not preclude the FDA from issuing a second notice or requiring Pfizer to do 
so, thus creating "the potential for inconsistent directions concerning a serious medical 
ailment and how it is best treated"). 
'58 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); see also 21 U.S.C. § 301(2000); Weinberger, 412 
U.S. at 654; Brief of the United States of America at 5, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-
01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002). 
'59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) (instructing that 
"[clompliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not 
prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precau-
tions."). 
'60 Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
"[aln FDA determination that a warning is not necessary may be sufficient for federal 
regulatory purposes but still not be sufficient for state tort law purposes."); Savina, 
795 P.2d at 931; Feldman, 479 A2d at 391. 
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provaU61 In fact, the FDA itself has recognized that manufac-
turers may add warnings without advance FDA approval.162 
This supports the argument that federal prescription labeling 
regulations do not preempt state tort law. 
IV. APPLICATION OF AGENCY PROCEDURES AND LEGAL 
DOCTRINES TO PAXIL AND PAXIL LITIGATION 
In GSK's motion for reconsideration of the preliminary in-
junctive order, the drug manufacturer asserted several de-
fenses. 163 GSK's defense was that the court did not have juris-
diction to make a ruling on prescription drug advertising.164 
GSK and the FDA argued that Congress intended the FDA's 
drug approval guidelines to preempt state law. 165 Conse-
quently, argued GSK and the FDA, the control and regulation 
of the Paxil television advertisements were within the FDA's 
exclusive jurisdictional power.166 
If the court did not find that the FDA had exclusive juris-
diction, GSK and the FDA alternatively argued that the FDA 
had primary jurisdiction over the issues of drug effectiveness 
and drug side effects. 16? According to this argument, since court 
lacks the scientific sophistication required to make scientific 
determinations, it would be an improper allocation of power to 
allow the court to have jurisdiction over issues that require sci-
entific expertise.16B Under this theory, GSK and the FDA ar-
161 E.g., Feldman, 479 A.2d at 390; In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp. 543, 
549-50 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
162 Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling 
for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (Food and Drug Admin. 
June 26, 1979)( stating "[tlhe addition to labeling and advertising of additional warn-
ings, as well as contraindications, adverse reactions, and precautions regarding the 
drug, or the issuance of letters directed to health care professionals is not prohibited by 
these regulations."). 
163 See Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), 
(C.D. Cal. filed October 21, 2002). 
164 Id. at 2. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167Id. at 3. 
168 Id. 
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gued that the court would be acting outside of its core compe-
tencies. 169 
The court first addressed GSK's and the FDA's position 
that the FDCA preempted state law.170 The court found that 
there was no evidence that Congress intended, either expressly 
or impliedly, for the FDCA to preempt state law. 171 By suggest-
ing that the FDA preempted state law, GSK and the FDA were 
in effect arguing that Congress opted not to provide for a pri-
vate cause of action while simultaneously doing away with 
state common-law claims.172 In fact, the court found, GSK's and 
the FDA's preemption position actually diminished, rather 
than advanced, the FDCA's purpose to protect the public. 173 
The court next addressed the deference of issues to the 
FDA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.174 In its opin-
ion, the court emphasized that it was not called on to resolve 
the question of whether Paxil is habit-forming. 175 It was con-
cerned only with whether the phrase could be misleading to 
consumers.176 Accordingly, the court held that it was not neces-
sary to explore issues such as drug effectiveness or drug side 
effects, which are areas undisputedly within the FDA's exper-
tise. 177 
In contrast, the court explained that in the case of the "non 
habit-forming" phrase used in commercials, the question of 
whether members of the general public are likely to "[misinter-
pret] a statement is within one of the courts' core competen-
cies."178 The court stated that it was unwilling to accept the 
FDA's determination, though it had given consideration to the 
extensive research done by the FDA with regard to Paxil and 
169 [d. 
170 [d. at 2. 
171 [d. at 2. The court said that GSK and the FDA arguments run contrary to 
other decisions. [d., citing Knoll, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 615; Ohler, 2002 WL 88945, at 
*7,8. 
172 [d. at 3. 
173 [d. (arguing that FDA and GSK's position on Congressional intent when enact-
ing the FDCA "contravenes common sense" and declining the parties' invitation to find 
that Congress declined to provide for a private cause of action and to eliminate avail-
ability of common law state claims). 
'" [d. 
175 [d. at 4. 
176 [d. 
177 [d. at 3. 
178 [d. 
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its approval of Paxil's advertisements."179 Ultimately, the court 
denied the preliminary injunction because the FDA's evidence 
was persuasive to the extent that it changed the court's evalua-
tion of the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits. ISO 
While the court denied the injunction, it succinctly ana-
lyzed the doctrines of preemption and primary jurisdiction 
within the context of the Paxil commercials.181 Although the 
same court also denied the certification of a state-wide class, 
plaintiffs are continuing to bring state actions against GSK, 
asserting, among other things, failure-to-warn claims.ls2 The 
next section sets out the current warning label found on Paxil, 
discusses the FDA's process of determining whether a drug is 
habit-forming, and illustrates the potential roadblocks plain-
tiffs may face. 
A. P AXIL WARNING LABELS 
The safety review of Paxil was conducted one year prior to 
its approva!.I83 Under the heading "Abuse," the FDA's safety 
review states: 
Incidents of tolerance, dependence and drug seeking were not 
observed in patients in the [Paxil] clinical trials. The absence 
of such incidents precluded the need for systematic study of 
this issue. [Prozac], a widely prescribed and pharmacologi-
179 Id. at 4. It should be noted that despite the court's reversal, GSK stopped 
using the phrase "Paxil is non habit-forming" at the end of television commercials. 
Zoloft, a different SSRI antidepressant, is currently running a television commercial 
which ends with the phrase "Zoloft is non habit-forming." 
180 Memorandum of Decision re: Preliminary Injunction at 7, In re Paxil Litiga· 
tion, No. CV 01-07937 MRP, (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 16, 2002) (citing Am. Motorcyclist 
Assoc. v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983). In order for the court to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction, the plaintiffs must establish four elements. Id. First plaintiffs must 
show a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Second, plaintiffs must show a signifi-
cant threat of irreparable injury. Id. Third, they must at least tip the scales of justice 
in the balance of hardships in favor of the plaintiff. Id. Finally, plaintiffs must prove a 
furtherance of public interest. Id. 
181 Memorandum of Decision re: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction at 4 (C.D. Cal. filed October 21, 2002). 
182 Interview with Donald Farber, Plaintiff Attorney, Law Offices of Donald J. 
Farber, in San Rafael, Cal. (Oct. 31, 2003) 
183 KLINE at 4, supra note 62. 
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cally similar compound, has not been abused since its intro-
duction into the market. lS4 
Based on the safety review, the agency decided that it did 
not consider Paxil to be a habit-forming drug. lsS The FDA con-
siders the term "habit-forming" to fall within the general cate-
gory of "drug abuse and dependence."ls6 
The FDA evaluated Paxil and its product labeling each 
time it has been approved for treatment of an additional condi-
tion. ls7 In addition, Paxil's labeling has been reviewed as a re-
sult of post-marketing reports of adverse events. ISS For in-
stance, in April 2001, Paxil was approved for treatment of gen-
eralized anxiety disorder. ls9 Included with the approval letter 
was a package label insert for the Adverse Reactions indicating 
potential side effects associated with discontinuation of its 
use. 190 Eight months later, in December 2001, Paxil was ap-
proved for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder.19l The 
package insert attached to that approval letter was revised due 
to additional reports of side effects associated with discontinua-
tion. 192 The label change moved the description of the discon-
tinuation side effects up from the Adverse Reactions section to 
the more significant Precautions section.193 
184 Id.; Martin Brecher, M.D., D.M.Sc., Review and Evaluation of Clinical Data, 
Safety Review at 32, Original NDA 20-031, Paroxetine, (June 19, 1991), In re Paxil 
Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), Exhibit l. 
185 SCARLETI' at 13, supra note 55. 
186 Id. at 11. 
187 See Declaration of Robert J. Temple, M.D. at 2, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-
01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2002). In September of 2002, Dr. Tem-
ple was the Director of the Office of Medial Policy and the Acting Director of the Office 
of Drug Evaluation. Id. at 1-2. Both offices are within the FDA's Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research Department. Id. The Office of Drug Evaluation decides 
whether to approve NDA's for neuropharmacologic/psychopharmacologic drug products. 
Id. He personally reviewed and approved the drug Paxil and its product labeling. Id. 
188 Id. at 2. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. Though the FDA doesn't consider SSRIs to be habit-forming, it does recog-
nize that SSRIs have been known to cause withdrawal symptoms known as "discon-
tinuation syndrome." Id. at 4-5. The FDA believes that there is a critical distinction 
between the phenomenon of "discontinuation syndrome" and the drug-seeking behavior 
associated with habit-forming drugs. Id. 
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Ultimately, the FDA has backed GSK's position claiming 
that there is no evidence that Paxil is habit-forming.194 Because 
the FDA does not associate the drug with addiction, it only re-
quired that GSK add a precaution to the labeling of Paxil to 
warn of potential side effects that may occur upon dis continua-
tion.195 The Precautions category falls third in the descending 
hierarchy of label sections.196 Precautions contain special care 
information for the practitioner, to ensure safe and effective 
use of the drug. 197 The package insert for Paxil carries the fol-
lowing precaution: 
. . . [T]he following adverse events were reported at an inci-
dence of 2% or greater for Paxil and were at least twice that 
reported for placebo: abnormal dreams (2.3% vs 0.5%), pares-
thesia (2.0% vs 0.4%), dizziness (7.1% vs 1.5%). In the major-
ity of patients, these events were mild to moderate and were 
self-limiting and did not require medical intervention. 
During Paxil marketing, there have been spontaneous reports 
of similar adverse events, which may have no causal relation-
ship to the drug, upon the discontinuation of Paxil (particu-
larly when abrupt), including the following: dizziness, sensory 
disturbances, (e.g., paresthesias such as electric shock sensa-
tions), agitation, anxiety, nausea, and sweating. These events 
are generally self-limiting. Similar events have been reported 
for other selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors. 
Patients should be monitored for these symptoms when dis-
continuing treatment, regardless of the indication for which 
Paxil is being prescribed. A gradual reduction in the dose 
rather than abrupt cessation is recommended whenever pos-
19< [d. at 4. 
195 http://www.fda.gov/medwatchiSAFETY/2001ldec01.htm (last visited 9/3/03); 
Federal Judge Reverses Order Barring Paxil TV Ads, 18 No. 8 ANDREWS 
PHARMACEUTICAL LITIG. REp. 14 (Nov. 2002); Telephone interview with Cindy Hall, 
Paralegal, Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo (Oct. 2, 2003). Karen Barth of 
Baum, Hedlund, Aristei, Guilford & Shiavo, the firm representing the plaintiffs case, 
has commented that it took the FDA over a decade to classify Valium, an anti-anxiety 
drug, as habit-forming. [d. 
196 NOAH at 327, supra note 52 (explaining that the second most important label-
ing category, called Warnings, is designated for serious adverse reaction risks, but the 
risks are not so serious as to clearly outweigh any possible benefit of the drug). 
197 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (0 (1), (2) (2003). There is a subsection under the Precau-
tions label designated for information to be given to patients to ensure safe and effec-
tive use of the drug. [d. This is generally where one would find precautionary infor-
mation, for example, not to drive while using the drug. See id. 
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sible. If intolerable symptoms occur following a decrease in 
the dose or upon discontinuation of treatment, then resuming 
the previously prescribed dose may be considered. Subse-
quently, the physician may continue decreasing dose but at a 
more gradual rate (see DOSAGE and ADMINISTRATION)198 
The label change reads that the symptoms "may have no 
causal relationship to the drug." Neither does it mention the 
terms "withdrawal" or "addictive."199 Because of this, the plain-
tiffs contend the label changes are too vaguely worded, even for 
physicians; hence they do not provide an adequate warning.20o 
The FDA maintains that during its review of the NDA for 
Paxil, medical reviewers and scientists determined that there 
was no clinical evidence of drug-seeking behavior associated 
with its use.201 Since the FDA determined Prucil to be non 
habit-forming, it considered patients to be adequately 
warned.202 
B. APPLICATION OF CURRENT LABELING REGULATIONS MAy 
PRODUCE UNJUST RESULTS 
Although drug manufacturers may theoretically change a 
label at any time to enhance drug safety, the reality is that 
manufacturers cannot change a label without FDA approva1.203 
The FDA reinforces its control over label revisions by requiring 
manufacturers to report all adverse experiences with a drug 
after it has been introduced to the general public.204 It is the 
FDA that makes the final determination whether reports of 
198 http://www.fda.gov/medwatchlSAFETY/200I/decOl.htm (last visited 10/15/03). 
TEMPLE at 2, supra note 187 (disclosing that the final printed label was released in 
January 2002). 
199 http://www.fda.gov/medwatchlSAFETY/2001/decOl.htm (last visited 10/15/03). See 
paragraph two oflabel text. [d. 
200 PEoPLE, supra note 1. 
201 TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187; SCARLETf at 4, supra note 55; KLINE at 4, supra 
note 62. 
202 TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187. 
203 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2)(i}-(iv) (2003) (permitting label changes to enhance 
safety). Cf Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the 
Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 233,236 (1986) (explaining 
that both the FDA and manufacturers do not foresee that labels may be changed with-
out prior approval). 
204 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.303(a) (2003), 310.305(b) (2003), 314.80(a) (2003). 
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adverse experiences warrant a label revision.205 Therefore, un-
der current law, even if courts continue to hold that manufac-
turers can add more information to warning labels, the FDA's 
regulations could make it difficult for manufacturers to make 
label revisions.206 
V. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE 
FAIRER RESULTS 
Plaintiffs in the recent Paxil litigation are claiming that 
the drug manufacturer failed to give adequate warnings that 
the drug produced withdrawal side effects commonly associated 
with habit-forming drugs.207 Whether the Paxil plaintiffs can 
successfully litigate claims against GSK could turn on how the 
court interprets "habit-forming." If a court applying state law 
decides that the question of whether Paxil is "habit-forming" is 
an essential part of the claim, the question should be deferred 
to the FDA for a factual determination.208 In contrast, if a court 
decides that whether Paxil is habit-forming is not essential to 
adjudicate the claim, a drug manufacturer could be held ac-
countable to supplement labeling in accordance with factual 
determinations made by the jury.209 
A. IF A COURT VIEWS "HABIT-FORMING" AS AN ESSENTIAL 
PART OF A PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
1. Strict Judicial Review 
The legal system must enforce a strict judicial review of 
the FDA's factual determinations before sending the determi-
nation back into the deferring court.210 If a court determines 
205 [d. 
206 Interview with Donald Farber, San Rafael, Ca (11/26/03). It should be noted 
that since the FDA does not possess any powers beyond those conferred on the federal 
government by the Constitution, prohibiting manufacturers from strengthening label 
warnings is a violation of the First Amendment. [d. Therefore, manufacturers have all 
the power they need to supply more information to the consumer. [d. 
207 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra Part III for explanation of primary jurisdiction. 
209 [d. 
210 KENNETH CULP DAVIS at 272-280, supra note 122; ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & 
WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 13.1 (2d ed. 2001); PRIMARY JURISDICTION 
at 1252, supra note 130. 
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that deciding the question of whether ProcH is habit-forming is 
an essential part of a claim, deferral to the FDA is appropri-
ate.2l1 If the issue is deferred to the FDA, the agency would 
need to assess Paxil for abuse potentiaU12 Next, the FDA's de-
termination on the question would undergo judicial review. 213 
If the FDA's action passes judicial review, the resolved issue 
would be returned to the deferring court.214 That court would 
then apply the law to the FDA's factual determination.215 
According to the FDA, Paxil is not habit-forming.216 If this 
determination passes judicial review, then there is no duty to 
warn the plaintiffs and, therefore, no breach.217 The result: the 
suit would be dismissed on summary judgment grounds.218 The 
effect: plaintiffs who suffered from severe withdrawal symp-
toms have no place to go to seek legal redress.219 This would 
suggest that Congress barred relief for persons injured by pre-
scription drugs as a result of a determination made by the very 
agency it empowered to provide for the safe and effective use of 
prescription drugs.22o 
2. Adoption of an Accepted Scientific Method 
If the FDA has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of 
"habit-forming," it is necessary for the FDA to adopt an ac-
cepted scientific method for determining the abuse potential of 
a drug. Abuse liability is complex and has many dimensions.221 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (defining the scope of judicial review and giving 
courts the power to set aside an agency action). 
21< Id.; see supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
215 Id. 
216 Brief of the United States at 2, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP 
(CWx) (C.D. Cal filed Sept. 4, 2002); TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187. 
217 See id. 
216 See id. 
219 See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text. 
220 Declaration of Erwin Chemerinsky at 3, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-
07937 MRP (CWx) (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 12, 2002) (citing Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 486-87 (1996». Erwin Chemerinsky is a law professor at the University of South-
ern California. Id. at 2. He has written four books, over 100 law review articles, and 
two treatises all relating to constitutional law and federal court jurisdiction. Id. 
221 DRAFT GUIDELINES at 2, supra note 64. (stating that "there is no single test or 
assessment procedure that, in itself, is likely to provide a full and complete characteri-
zation. Rather the assessment of abuse liability must be based upon review of all 
available data ... and summary risks intended to the public health following introduc-
tion of the substance to the general population"). 
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Currently the FDA's approach to determining abuse potential 
is outlined in the Draft Guidelines for Abuse Liability Assess-
ment (hereinafter "guidelines").222 Due to the many different 
assessment procedures and the continually evolving nature of 
science in the area of substance abuse, the FDA's guidelines 
decline to adopt a "cookbook" of specific tests.223 Rather, the 
guidelines encourage a "considerable degree of scientific flexi-
bility with respect to precise methods."224 
According to the guidelines, not all drugs are assessed to 
the same degree for abuse potentia1.225 The FDA characterizes 
the substance in relation to its chemical structure and class.226 
The guidelines point out that "some" assessment should be per-
formed for any new drug that is being developed for an indica-
tion that has previously been treated with habit-forming 
drugs.227 Determinations of whether more specific testing is 
needed are based on the substance's categorical class.228 If the 
substance is from a new class of drugs, then the guidelines 
suggest that it "may" be better to select a comparison class to 
act as a reference against which the new substance can be com-
pared.229 
Paxil is an SSRI antidepressant. 23o According to FDA sci-
entists, SSRIs as a class are not habit-forming.231 As a result, 
during Paxil's safety review, the FDA examined only those 
clinical studies provided by the drug manufacturer. 232 The FDA 
felt that no further independent testing was necessary.233 The 
FDA affirmed their conclusion by comparing Paxil with Prozac, 
another SSRI. 234 
222 [d. Note that the guidelines are in draft form; this author was not able to find 
them submitted in the federal register, or codified in the Code of Federal Regulation. 
223 [d. 
22. See id. (The emphasis of the guidelines is on the types of issues to be addressed 
rather than specific methodology). 
225 [d. 
22S [d. 
227 See JOHN H. GREIST, M.D. AND JAMES W. JEFFERSON, M.D., DEPRESSION AND 
ITS TREATMENT 51 (American Psychiatric Press 1992) (explaining that people suffering 
from depression may abuse alcohol or other drugs in attempts to self-medicate). 
228 DRAFI' GUIDELINES at 2, supra note 64. 
229 [d. at 5. 
230 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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The safety review noted that there have been no reports of 
"habit-forming" traits since Prozac's introduction to the mar-
ket.235 The FDA, however, has not independently assessed 
Poocil's abuse potential.236 It has, instead, reached its determi-
nation solely from information provided by the drug manufac-
turer.237 
If the FDA is granted exclusive jurisdiction over the fac-
tual determination of whether Paxil is habit-forming, the FDA 
needs to conduct independent studies on Paxil's abuse poten-
tiaP38 It would be highly likely that a judicial review of the 
FDA's factual determinations regarding abuse potential would 
disclose when a drug, such as Paxil, has not been independ-
ently tested.239 Judicial review would therefore be an effective 
way to ensure that the FDA performs independent studies on a 
drug rather than simply relying on information provided by the 
drug manufacturer. 
B. A COURT MAy NOT NEED TO KNow IF PAXIL IS "HABIT-
FORMING" IN ORDER TO RESOLVE A CLAIM 
A court may decide that it is not necessary to resolve the 
technical issue of "whether Paxil is habit-forming" to resolve 
the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim.240 The court could then 
compare Paxil's label warnings with the plaintiffs' alleged ex-
periences to determine if the manufacturer's warnings were 
235 Id. 
236 Id.; see supra notes 221-229 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra note 18 for discussion about Paxil's short half-life and the relation-
ship between habit-forming traits and the half life of a drug. 
238 Interview with Donald Farber, Law Offices of Donald J. Farber, San Rafael, 
Cal. (Nov. 26, 2003). 
239 Id. 
uo Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 19, In re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed 
Aug., 12, 2002), (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 175 F. Supp.2d 593, 617 (S.D.N.Y 2001) ("IT)he issues raised by these claims may 
require some technical analysis, questions of whether a product is in fact defective, 
whether defendants breached any duties owed to plaintiffs by marketing such a prod-
uct or failing to give adequate warnings, whether a defendant has conspired to mislead 
the public regarding the hazards of a product, and whether a plaintiffs injuries were 
caused by a defendants' conduct, are legal questions that fall within the conventional 
experience of judges, not administrative agencies."). 
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adequate.241 In the Paxil litigation, plaintiffs would be able to 
litigate claims and possibly obtain relief for damages.242 
1. Labeling Requirements Should Be Minimal Standards 
The FDA should not be granted exclusive jurisdiction over 
the term "habit-forming" for several reasons. First, the term 
has no accepted medical meaning and should not fall within 
the FDA's expertise.243 "Habit-forming" is a lay term and 
should be defined from a societal perspective.244 As such, in a 
failure-to-warn situation, the issues should be resolved by the 
jury.245 
Second, the effect of allowing the FDA to determine what 
"habit-forming" means to the general population is that impor-
tant risk information would be diluted or kept from drug label-
ing. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, if the informa-
tion is not included in the drug label, physicians do not have 
access to it.246 If a physician is not aware of a drug's potential 
risk, he or she cannot properly balance the information or pass 
important information on to patients. 
Third, the issue is not whether Paxil is habit-forming. 
Rather, the issue is whether physicians and patients are ade-
quately warned of the potential withdrawal side effects associ-
ated with discontinuation of Paxil. When a patient experiences 
severe side effects from a drug without proper warning (as al-
leged by the plaintiffs in the Paxil litigation) it is a factual de-
termination within the jurisdiction of the courtS.247 
24' See supra Part I for current labeling requirements and Part IV for withdrawal 
symptoms associated with Procil. 
242 See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text. 
243 Interview with Donald Farber, San Rafael, Cal. (Nov. 26, 2003) . 
... TEMPLE at 4, supra note 187 (declaring that "[the FDA thinks that habit-
forming] generally implies that patients will seek out the drug and continue to take it 
in the absence of a medical need."); But cf Declaration of Kellyanne Conway at 2-5, In 
re Paxil Litigation, No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept., 12, 2002) (Ex-
plaining results of opinion poll which asked the average American to define "habit-
forming" in their own words). To define "habit-forming" more than 25% used the terms 
"addiction" or "becoming addicted." Id. Almost 20% responded that it was "something 
you do over and over," "all the time," or "a lot." Id. Close to 15% sad it was "something 
you can't stop." Id. 
,.. Id. 
246 See mpn notes 82-96 and accompanying text. 
24' See Chemerinsky at 4, supra note 220. 
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2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Finally, the administrative process prescribed in the FDCA 
requires an aggrieved person to petition the FDA by filing a 
citizen petition.24B The FDA must consider the petition and is-
sue a decision to the citizen within 180 days.249 The FDA has 
already stated that it does not view Paxil as "habit-forming."25o 
As such, the filing of a citizen petition would be a futile effort 
increasing delay.251 Therefore, a court should not require the 
exhaustion of this administrative remedy before reviewing the 
FDA's determination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Even though the FDA has concluded that Paxil is non 
habit-forming, it is unlikely that the litigation surrounding 
Paxil will disappear. The fact that the FDA has moved the de-
scription of withdrawal effects into the Precautions label head-
ing is not enough to ensure that physicians are being ade-
quately educated about potential severe withdrawal effects as-
sociated with Paxil and SSRIs. The reality is that when some 
patients try to stop using Paxil they experience withdrawal 
effects that are so debilitating that they are forced back onto 
the drug. They feel violated because they were not warned.252 
In light of the flood of recent litigation, it is important for 
courts to understand how preemption and primary jurisdiction 
arguments fit into products liability law. Courts need to estab-
lish an appropriate working relationship with the FDA regard-
ing claims that arguably fall within the FDA's regulatory 
scheme. The FDA needs to adopt an accepted scientific method 
to assess the abuse potential of new drugs. Strict judicial re-
view is essential to examine the breadth of the FDA's regula-
tory power, to ensure that the agency is promoting public 
health through the safe and effective use of prescription drugs. 
Otherwise, primary jurisdiction becomes a judicially-made doc-
trine employed by agencies to avoid liability for injuries to 
248 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2003). 
249 Id. 
250 Plaintiffs Response to Brief of the United States at 9, In re Paxil Litigation, 
No. CV-01-07937 MRP (CWx), (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 23, 2002). 
251 Id. 
252 See supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiffs. This result would grant the FDA a plenary power 
that conflicts with the very purpose of our court system. 
DENISE K. Top· 
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